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iv (ESG) and amphibious shipping. Here, the CCDR must weigh the benefit of committing the MEU within a mature theater 2 against the risk of being unable to support other objectives or respond quickly to a crisis. The MEU's deployment to trouble spots in Iraq does, for many reasons, enhance the combat effectiveness of the overall joint force. On the other hand, some employment options may better support the CCDR's requirements than others. Therefore, this paper proposes that when employing the ESG/MEU, the CCDR should consider options that afford maximum flexibility, security, and unity of command to mitigate risk to the joint force, advance U.S. interests, and facilitate rapid response to potential crises in the geographic area of responsibility. Ultimately, this operational employment parameter could generate significant positive strategic consequences for the CCDR and the nation.
The United States' ability to respond rapidly and manage global crises effectively sends powerful messages of national strength to adversaries and commitment to international partners. 3 Crises, or lesser contingencies as described in the National Defense Strategy, include operations such as humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, noncombatant evacuation operations, and search and rescue operations. These missions are normally characterized by shorter planning, response, and execution times than large scale combat operations. 4 Although shorter in duration, successful crisis response missions protect and advance U.S.
interests abroad while demonstrating U.S. goodwill to the international community. 5 The ESG offers a unique capability to the operational commander. Made up of three surface combatants (e.g. cruiser, destroyer, or frigate), one submarine (SSN), one
Amphibious Readiness Group (ARG), and one embarked MEU, the ESG deploys with a multitude of naval and "expeditionary strike" capabilities. 6 The ESG commander and staff are designed to bridge the gap between the tactical and operational levels of command and bring added capacity for planning and execution to the CCDR. 7 The MEU, a well trained and adaptable force that specializes in crisis action planning and response is capable of performing tactical missions across the range of military operations (ROMO). 8 When integrated with its assigned MEU and ARG, the ESG becomes a formidable Navy-Marine
Corps task force capable of performing missions on land and sea. Unfortunately, the number of ESG/MEUs deployed is limited. Normally, the Navy and Marine Corps can support simultaneous deployments of two to three ESG/MEUs on a continuous basis. 9 One ESG/MEU each is generally available to European Command, Central Command, and
Pacific Command for tasking.
COMMITTING THE MEU DETACHED FROM THE ESG
In an operational environment with many competing priorities, the CCDR must choose when and where to use his limited resources. When operating in mature theaters, employing the MEU detached from the ESG provides the CCDR notable advantages in the operational factors of force, space, and time. First, the MEU is a force multiplier that is unrivaled in training, readiness, and morale. Each MEU undergoes a strict pre-deployment training plan for six months prior to deployment. 10 Further, each MEU battalion and squadron conducts individual and unit training, and undergoes a combat readiness evaluation before joining the MEU. 11 In all, each element of the MEU's Marine Air Ground Task Force has trained and prepared for its missions for more than one year before deployment.
Likewise, the MEU brings its equipment and sustainment to the area of responsibility (AOR)
in an immediately employable state of readiness. Prior to embarkation, the MEU focuses its efforts on achieving the highest personnel and equipment readiness. 12 17 The MEU's ability to act as a force multiplier and accomplish the most challenging assignments, with or without the ESG, makes it an appealing employment option to the operational commander in need of first rate forces.
Clearly, there are advantages to employing the MEU in mature theaters. This essay does not dispute the decisions of CCDRs and other operational commanders who choose to separate the MEU from its parent ESG and commit it to the current ITO. On the other hand, the same reasons that make the MEU a valuable tool in a mature theater also make it an invaluable asset for expeditionary and crisis action environments. By employing the ESG and MEU together, the CCDR and subordinate operational commanders can leverage the full capability of the force without compromise. Moreover, committing the MEU in a mature theater, separated from the ESG, levies risks to the overall joint force and impedes the operational commander's ability to respond to crisis and advance other U.S. interests abroad.
MITIGATING RISK TO THE JOINT FORCE
Among the key risk considerations associated with committing the MEU to a mature theater are joint force availability, strategic deployment, and operational mobility. Foremost, joint force availability considers other forces willing and able to respond to crisis situations.
The combatant commands (COCOMs), including Joint Forces Command (JFCOM), have established Standing Joint Force Headquarters (SJFHQ) to improve crisis response time.
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The SJFHQ in a geographic COCOM has the advantage of AOR situational awareness, but the JFCOM SJFHQ must prepare for a wider range of geographic employment possibilities. 19 Upon identification of a potential crisis response mission, the SJFHQ utilizes its regional expertise to conduct contingency planning, identify and assemble required forces, and arrange logistics requirements. 20 During this planning and deployment process, the unresolved crisis may continue to escalate resulting in the loss of valuable response time for the joint force. In addition, forces assembled to respond to such contingencies may be the same forces that were recently deployed to Iraq or Afghanistan, which violates dwell considerations and causes unnecessary hardships on Service members and their families.
Once the SJFHQ determines the nature of the crisis and the required capabilities to deal effectively with the situation, it must arrange strategic lift assets to move the required personnel and equipment to the area of operations. Depending on the nature and location of the crisis, this can prove to be a serious challenge. First responders, deploying from the continental United States or forward operating bases to distant locations, are forced to move via airlift as sealift options are too slow. On the other hand, strategic airlift capacity is limited, and requires improved runways and follow-on ground transportation. When responding to crisis in Third-World Nations, the intra-theater movement becomes as challenging as the inter-theater lift. Inadequate Host Nation Support (HNS) and unimproved roadways hinder the mobility of the force. Getting the right personnel, equipment, and supplies to the crisis situation, in time, can become more challenging than the mission itself.
Challenging as it may be, the joint force is capable of providing the CCDR alternatives for crisis response. However, do these alternatives truly mitigate the risk and provide a comparable capability to the ESG/MEU team during crises?
The ESG/MEU provides the CCDR a packaged capability that is immediately employable during crises. Its forward deployed posture facilitates the expeditious movement of personnel and equipment, via sealift, to the area of operations. Once in the area, the ESG/MEU is capable of conducting amphibious offloads thereby negating the requirement for improved ports and airfields. If expeditionary airfields are available, the MEU's organic A/C-130 aircraft, available on a 72 to 96 hour tether, are capable of transporting people and things within the theater. 21 Further, when commanded by a general or flag officer, the ESG HQ is capable of assuming the role of a "mini" Combined Joint Task Force Headquarters (CJTF). 22 This capability provides the CCDR with both a means for first response and a command and control structure for the employment of follow-on forces. Ultimately, the ESG/MEU helps mitigate the CCDR's risks associated with planning, organizing, and deploying a joint force by providing a forward deployed, immediately employable capability for crisis management.
In 2005, U.S. forces were called upon to provide relief after devastating earthquakes killed and injured over 100,000 people and left another 3.5 million displaced in Pakistan.
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Based on his proximity to the incident and availability, the Commander, ESG-1 was assigned the mission of establishing and leading the CJTF to respond to the disaster. Assembling specific capabilities from the joint force, including U.S. Air Force expeditionary airfield units, naval mobile construction units, and army medical units, the ESG-1 staff led a successful effort that paid terrific dividends in improved international opinion to the United
States. 24 However, this mission was far more challenging for the joint force than necessary.
Among the lessons learned and identified by the ESG-1 commander were the need for joint humanitarian assistance/disaster relief (HA/DR) training, the "rigidity" of the force flow process for HA/DR missions, and the ability to minimize the U.S. footprint -all capabilities an ESG/MEU brings to the table. 25 Prior to the earthquake, 13th MEU was disembarked and detached from ESG-1 for employment in the ITO. 26 Employing the MEU in the ITO fenced it from immediate retasking and left the ESG with no tactical HA/DR capability. In turn, the joint force was required to assemble a capability from scratch rather than using its best trained, prepared, and equipped forces for the job. Indeed the result was effective, but at the expense of efficiency. By employing the ESG and the MEU as a team, the combatant commander could have simplified the planning, expedited the response time, and reduced the overall requirements on an already overburdened joint force.
ADVANCING U.S. INTERESTS
Along with managing the risks associated with crisis response, the CCDR must also consider the ESG/MEU's contributions to U.S. interests worldwide before committing the forces. The ESG/MEU provides the CCDR with a key capability to execute Theater Security Cooperation (TSC) initiatives that can produce positive effects far outweighing their costs.
When the ESG/MEU is available to conduct military exercises with foreign armed forces, its actions strengthen diplomatic ties between the United States and the participating nations. In addition to assuring allies, the ESG/MEU provides the CCDR with a continuous sea-based forward presence that serves to deter and dissuade potential adversaries from committing aggressive actions. 28 Similar to the psychological effects generated by positioning a Carrier Strike Group (CSG) off the coast of a belligerent state, the ESG/MEU's mere presence can deter potential hostilities. 29 Amplifying the psychological impact, the ESG/MEU brings a formidable "expeditionary strike" (air and ground task force) capability that can also put boots on the ground and hold key terrain. 30 During joint shaping operations, the ESG/MEU clearly provides a means for the CCDR to assure allies, and deter and dissuade adversaries. Equally as important, however, is the capability the ESG/MEU provides when a hostile action requires a kinetic military response. When the time comes to defeat an enemy, the ESG/MEU serves as an immediately employable joint task force (JTF) enabler. 31 Whether the CCDR needs to secure a critical port or airfield to facilitate the throughput of follow-on forces or merely establish a presence to suppress hostilities, the ESG/MEU possesses command and control structure and tactical capability to execute the task. Once in the joint operations area (JOA), the ESG/MEU enables establishment of joint force operational functions from intelligence collection and sustainment coordination to the protection of inbound forces. In all, the ESG/MEU is a single force capable of supporting a wide range of U.S. strategic objectives, from assuring allies to deterring and dissuading adversaries to defeating enemies, when necessary. Further, the MEU's sea-based operations give it the ability to plan, launch, and recover missions from a secure location. For an ad hoc JTF, or even SOF, the O'Grady TRAP would have required significantly more planning and logistics at the cost of time. 
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RESPONDING TO CRISIS
CONCLUSIONS
The ESG/MEU concept has generated its share of criticism. However, when properly employed, its basic premise of incorporating a forward deployed command to manage higher level operational concerns for the MEU is sound. Whether deployed aboard amphibious ships, positioned at a forward operating base, or designed as a fly-away capability, the ESG's forward focus provides the CCDR options for command and control of joint force headquarters during a crisis. 40 When the ESG is paired with the MEU, the CCDR possesses a force package capable of providing first responder action during crisis and enabling the arrival of follow-on units, if necessary.
While the examples clearly illustrate the unique capabilities of the ESG/MEU for crisis response, they also show the advantages that can be gained by employing the forces together. Whether utilizing the ESG/MEU in a mature theater or responding to contingencies in an austere environment, the CCDR should consider options that afford maximum security, flexibility, and unity of command. By following these tenets, the CCDR can mitigate risk to the overall joint force, support fully national strategic objectives, and respond to unique crisis situations suitable only for a sea-based force.
Unfortunately, when the MEU is committed in a mature theater, separated from its assigned ESG, the CCDR and the nation lose valuable consequence management capacity.
Foremost, the ESG/MEU is designed and trained to work as an insurance policy for the United States, responding to contingencies when they arise. While the MEU is fully capable of operating in a mature theater, this practice seems to violate the joint force principle of assigning the right force to the right job. What's more, less capable joint forces are often required to fill in when the MEU is committed. The CCDR must resist the temptation to employ the MEU, separated from the ESG, despite force shortfalls and the obvious combat power benefits brought by the MEU.
While the primary function of the ESG/MEU is crisis action oriented, there are multiple employment options for a mature theater that won't disrupt its flexibility, security, and unity of command, but will still support the CCDR's requirements. Critical to these options are keeping the ESG/MEU command and control structure intact, keeping the MEU within reach of its sea-base, and employing the MEU so as to enable quick retasking and redeployment. With these principles in mind, the CCDR and/or subordinate operational commanders can employ the ESG/MEU in either expeditionary environments or mature theaters, without compromising its core capabilities. More importantly, adhering to these employment options will ensure the ESG/MEU is ready when the nation calls.
RECOMMENDATIONS
The following recommendations provide the CCDR specific options for employing the ESG/MEU in mature theaters or expeditionary environments without compromising its unity of command, flexibility, or security.
The CCDR should seek employment options that maintain the command relationships between the ESG and the MEU to facilitate rapid redeployment and retasking in the event of crises. For this concept to work, however, the ESG/MEU must be reserved for missions within its operational reach. While this may have been a limiting factor in austere environments in the past, current technology has enabled sea-based units to extend beyond traditional limits. On the other hand, options for employing the ESG/MEU together in a mature theater seem less relevant. In the current ITO the ESG/MEU are routinely separated so the MEU can be employed in theater, under the operational control of another headquarters. While this may be the easiest method, it is not the best. Rather than break the command relationship between the ESG and MEU, the CCDR, in coordination with subordinate operational commanders, could utilize the ESG/MEU to cover the seam between the maritime environment and the land environment. 41 The naval forces of the ESG can assure proper coordination between themselves and the deepwater naval operations while the MEU's operations section can handle coordination with land forces. 42 This employment option leverages the unique sea and land capabilities of the Navy and Marine forces while keeping the MEU in reach of its sea-based aviation, intelligence, and logistics support. 43 And, by keeping the ESG and MEU tied both geographically and through their command structure, the CCDR can mitigate the risk associated with not being capable of responding rapidly to crises. In addition, the continuous reach-back to its sea-base provides the MEU with operational protection and sustainment far less achievable in traditional land based operations.
The CCDR should capitalize on the inherent security gained by the ESG/MEU's seabased platforms when assigning its missions. In fact, there are many missions the ESG/MEU can perform from an embarked position in either an austere environment or in a mature theater. During Operation UNIFIED ASSISTANCE, the Government of Indonesia requested that the U.S. military minimize its footprint in order to not suggest a permanent presence to the local population. The ESG/MEU responded by moving the majority of its personnel and equipment back to the amphibious shipping at night and returning in the morning to continue its HA/DR activities. In a mature theater, the ESG/MEU can also perform a wide range of missions for the operational commander from its embarked position: Amphibious raids, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), and mass casualty evacuation to name a few. 44 These missions are generally short in duration and allow the ESG/MEU to plan, launch, and recover from its sea-base. In turn, the ESG/MEU is capable of using the sea to achieve security, maneuver, and surprise. Likewise, employing the ESG/MEU from its seabased position affords the CCDR maximum flexibility for retasking or committing his forces.
The CCDR should consider the range of capabilities the ESG/MEU brings to the joint force and employ it in such a manner that does not limit its flexibility. Although not considered a popular tactical mission, the operational reserve is a critical operational consideration that requires the dedication of first class forces. In a mature theater, the ESG/MEU provides the operational commander with the necessary combat power and leadership to serve as the operational reserve. When it is time to commit the reserve, the ESG/MEU possesses the capability to reach the objective and reinforce success without Throughout this paper, the Marine Expeditionary Unit will be identified as MEU regardless of its special operations capability.
